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In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three 
categories of friendship: friendships  of utility, pleasure, and 
virtue. He further argues that friendships are a necessary part 
of the  eudaimon life for people (1155a) as well as a relevant 
aspect of a successful and unified polity,  for they serve the 
legislators’ goal to “expel civil conflict” and promote justice 
(1155a25). The  question arises as to what type of friendship 
best characterizes such ‘civic friendship.’ Many  scholars, 
including Sibyl Schwartzenbach in her paper “On Civic 
Friendships,” take Aristotle to  argue that political friendships 
are friendships of utility (105). However, I will argue that a 
more  appropriate interpretation of Aristotle’s work indicates 
that political friendship is actually a virtue  friendship. Since 
Aristotle clearly considers cultivating virtue to be a significant 
part of a  legislator’s role in a polis, I will argue that it clearly 
follows that legislators must not only tend to  concord and 
justice between the citizens, but also, to foster the best sort 
of friendship between  citizens. Lastly, I will consider certain 
aspects of the United States current political climate to  show 
the danger of deflating civic friendship to a relationship 
grounded solely on utility.  
I. Schwartzenbach’s View of Civic Friendship as Utility 
Friendship  
Schwarzenbach, in her paper “On Civic Friendship,” 
argues that modern political thought  seems to have 
abandoned Aristotle’s premise that a thriving political society 
is characterized by  friendship between citizens among 
themselves and between leaders and their populace. She  
states that “a plethora of views on the problem of political 
unity… barely mention friendship  or else explicitly reject it as 
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a serious contender.” Schwarzenbach hopes to counteract this  
development by arguing that “political friendship emerges 
as a necessary condition for genuine  justice” and a unified 
“modern state” (98). 
Schwarzenbach begins her argument by offering 
an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of  friendship. She 
argues that all types of friendship, including “both pleasure 
and [utility]  friendships for Aristotle necessarily retain the 
aspect of wishing the other well for that other’s  own sake” 
(100). She further argues that even friendships where “one 
loves the other friend  under some particular and limited 
description only,” such as advantage or utility friendship, the  
object of the friends’ love is the other person (100). However, 
if this is the case, she still must  offer a description to save 
Aristotle’s distinction between utility, pleasure, and virtue  
friendships. She accomplishes this by arguing that “what in fact 
distinguishes virtue  friendship from the other two kinds is, 
rather, that the description under which one loves the  other is 
a description of that other’s whole (or near whole) character” 
(100).  
All of Schwarzenbach’s analyses are directed at 
justifying an expansive reading of  advantage or utility 
friendships so that her underlying assumption that civic 
friendships are of  that type becomes more palatable. Her 
overall goal is to argue that the political unity necessary to  
reclaim our overly partisan modern state can be achieved 
through a “political friendship, that is,  the traits of mutual 
awareness, of wishing the other well for their own sake, and 
of doing things  for the civic friend are still retained… [and] 
evidenced in a general concern ” (105). However, I  argue that 
her interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the three types of 
friendship and her  categorization of civic friendship is not 
strongly supported by the text. Instead, her claims that  civic 
friendship is characterized by mutual valuing of other citizens 
for themselves would be  better supported by an interpretation 
of Aristotle that places civic friendship in the category of  virtue 
friendships.  
II. Virtue Friendships 
Like Schwarzenbach, I think that political unity is 
best served by relationships between  citizens founded on an 
appreciation of each other’s value as a person and a desire that 




analysis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , I  find substantive 
evidence that somewhat contradicts Schwarzenbach’s claim that 
the quality of  ‘valuing the friend for themselves’ is to be found 
in all types of friendships. Beginning with his  classification of 
the types of friendships, Aristotle states that the types of love 
are distinguished  by “the three objects of love. For each object 
of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving”  (1156a7). I 
take this to mean that utility friendships are those in which the 
object of love is not  the person themselves, nor the description 
under which the person themselves is loved as  Schwarzenbach 
interpreted. Instead, the object of love is that aspect of the 
person that the friend  finds useful, or perhaps even the services 
the friend provides. Furthermore, in utility friendships  the 
friends do not wish goods on the other for their own sake, 
rather “those who love each other  wish goods to each other 
[only] insofar as they love each other. Those who love each 
other for  utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar 
as they gain some good for themselves from  him” (1156a10). 
Aristotle writes further that “those who love for utility or 
pleasure, then, are  fond of a friend because of what is good or 
pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the beloved is  who he 
is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant” (1156a15). Thus, we 
must search for another  explanation for how civic friendships 
contain the qualities of valuing the friend for themselves  and 
their characters, and wish goods for their friend’s own sake as 
both Schwarzenbach and I  believe they do.  
Now that we can set aside utility and pleasure 
friendships as contenders for the  categorization of civic 
friendships, I will turn to the remaining type: virtue 
or character  friendships. Aristotle argues that virtue 
friendships have three main features: they are between 
equals (1157b37, 1158b), each friend values the other for 
themselves and their whole character  (1157b2), and each 
friend wants good things for the other, for the other’s sake 
(1155b28). He  considers these types of friendships the most 
complete and friendship-like friendship there is.  The other 
types of friendships are sometimes said to merely “[bear] 
some resemblance to this  complete sort” (1157a). There is 
one additional qualification of these friendships: “complete  
friendship is the friendship of good people similar in 
virtue….Hence these people’s friendship  lasts as long as 
they are good; and virtue is enduring” (1156b7).  
Virtue friendships are overall the best friendships, 
according to Aristotle. Such friends  value the other for 
themselves and their characters. As such, they are willing to 
do the work  necessary to preserve and maintain their friend’s 
virtues (11596). Altogether, it seems that virtue  friendships 
serve the goals of Schwarzenbach’s civic friendships more 
clearly in the text.  However, it remains to be seen whether 
Aristotle would see it that way. In my next section, I 
will  advance my argument that Aristotle too would have 
categorized civic friendships as virtue  friendships, or at the 
very least, more like virtue friendships than utility friendships. 
 III. Virtuous Civic Friendships and Concord  
It is clear throughout the sections on friendship in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle  sees friendship as an integral 
part of a successful political society. He states that “friendship  
would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem 
to be more concerned about it  than about justice” because 
good friends won’t need justice and regulations from political 
leaders  in order to do right by their fellow citizens (1155a25). 
Though it is clear Aristotle believes in a  sort of civic friendship, 
he does not state clearly how to classify it according to his 
three kinds of  friendship or whether it forms an independent 
type of friendship altogether. However, in considering his 
description of concord, I argue that virtue friendship would 
best characterize  civic friendship.  
Aristotle states that “concord would seem to be similar 
to friendship” (1155a25). Indeed,  he goes farther by arguing 
that “a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree 
on what is  advantageous, make the same decision, and act on 
their common resolution” (1167a25).  Furthermore, “concord, 
then, is apparently [civic] friendship… for it is concerned 
with  advantage and with what affects life [as a whole]” 
(1167b, brackets in original). At first glance,  this statement 
would seem to indicate that concord, and the friendship it 
implies, is a relationship  based on mutual utility. I argue that 
this interpretation is incorrect for in the next breath, Aristotle  
claims that “concord is found in decent people…. They 
wish for what is just and advantageous,  and also seek it in 
common” (1167b5) and that “base people, however, cannot be 
in concord”  (1167b10). Therefore, base people, or unvirtuous 
people, cannot develop civic friendships. From these, it seems 
quite clear that concord, or civic friendships, must be a sort 




is inappropriately conflating ‘advantage’ with  ‘utility’. In the 
context of the above passage, the advantage that is discussed 
is not for some  immediate good for an individual such as 
would be served by utility. Rather, it deals with an  advantage 
that is held in common, shared between the various citizens. 
Additionally, the  advantage mentioned is that which “affects 
life [as a whole]” (1167b, brackets in original) which  more 
appropriately refers to the advantages of a whole life well lived 
with virtue.  
Additional evidence for my argument that civic 
friendships are virtue friendships can be  found earlier 
in the text. To clarify the statement that civic friendships 
are founded on  advantage, I’ll briefly discuss the type 
of advantage specific to civic society. In a political  
community, Aristotle writes that citizens and legislators 
“aim not at some advantage close at  hand, but at 
advantage for the whole of life” (1160a20). Advantage for 
the whole life, I would  argue could roughly correspond 
to the good. The good, as we know from the rest of 
Nicomachean Ethics, is achieved through a whole long life 
(1100a7) of activity in accordance  with virtue (1099a15) 
accompanied by sufficient external goods (1099a30) and 
friends  (1170b17).  
Furthermore, cultivating virtues within their citizens 
seems to be part of the excellence of  the legislator. Aristotle 
wrote “it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve 
[the good] for… people and for cities” (1094b10), and “the 
goal of political science [is] the best good; and most  of its 
attention is devoted to the character of the citizens, to make 
them good people who do fine  actions” (1099b30). Clearly, 
there is a relationship between legislators’ goals to promote 
concord,  chase away enmity between citizens, and develop 
their virtue. With legislators necessarily  preoccupied with 
habituating good character, it seems right that the friendships 
that develop  between such citizens would recognize the 
value of their counterparts as tied up with their virtue.  I see 
a strong connection with the legislators’ responsibility to tend 
to the virtues of the citizens  and their other roles around 
producing advantageous conditions for people’s whole lives 
and their  goal of producing concord. Each of these goals feed 
into one another. Thus, it seems quite fitting  to categorize 
the relationships between citizens on a horizontal axis, and 
between citizens and  their legislators on a vertical axis, as 
virtue friendships.  
IV. Legislators’ Responsibility for Civic Virtue and 
Concord: Worries About American  Politics  
Considering politics today, it is quite obvious that 
people care about the ethical characters  of their fellow citizens. 
Citizens worry about the questionably moral choices of their 
elected officials–vote trading, bailouts to big corporations over 
small businesses, and campaigns marked  by big-spender 
schmoozing. On top of these activities between legislators, 
newspaper opinion  columns are replete with editorials 
lamenting the rise of rancorous partisanship, especially in the  
wake of the 2016 and 2020 elections. It seems quite obvious that 
the United States has lost even  the semblance of civic unity 
or agreement over what is advantageous for the nation as a 
whole. I  argue that this situation may stem, at least in part, 
from an abdication of responsibility by our  leaders to “aim 
at concord among all, while they try above all to expel civil 
conflict, which is  enmity” (1155a25). While citizens seem to 
care increasingly about their fellow citizens’ moral  character, 
legislators seem to have set aside any hope of developing any 
kind of relationship  among citizens marked by mutual valuing 
of another for themselves.  
Congress has done little to catalyze an appreciation 
among citizens of their common good  and common goals. Not 
only have they failed to address the rising partisanship among 
the  populace, they seem to fuel it with rhetoric saturated with 
political rage and revolving around  stimulating contempt and 
partisan enmity. Some elected officials, like retiring senator 
Tom  Udall, have raised concerns about “a culture [that] valued 
partisanship over the country’s best  interests” (Broadwater). 
I think that many of us are tired of the discord and contempt 
that marks  our political relationships. I believe that one 
possible solution to these attitudes is a shift from  thinking of 
our fellow citizens as means to our individual advantage to 
an appreciation of them  as people who are valuable in and of 
themselves.  
In most modern liberal democracies and republics, 
there is an underlying doctrine of  viewpoint neutrality–that 
a precondition for living together in a diverse nation is in part  
contingent on one’s fellow citizens minding their own business 
on certain (sometimes moral,  especially religious) matters. 




forming character friendships between citizens. However, 
that would be a subject for further questioning.  Altogether, 
if politicians and ordinary people could begin to cultivate 
relationships even at the  local or community level founded 
on desiring the good things in life for their neighbors because  
they are good neighbors, a new culture of unity could arise.  
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